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Abstract
In this paper we explore mirroring challenges
when an incumbent firm endeavor digital innovation.
More specifically, we describe how AutoInc,
organized according to the physical vehicle it
produces, is challenged when an “over the air”
software service is developed and implemented.
Using the mirroring hypothesis as a point of
departure to understand existing and emerging
innovation networks, we recognize anarchistic
actions. The analysis reveals the emergence of
anarchic actions and how they challenge wellestablished federative innovation networks within the
organization. With continued focus on technology,
the project and organization disregarded necessary
social structure development, which resulted in
reduced capabilities to utilize the digitalized service.
This qualitative paper also illustrates how the
mirroring hypothesis, although originating from
product innovation literature, can be used to
understand digitalization dynamics. To the end, the
analysis shows that the digital product innovation
classification structure may need additional tuning.

1. Introduction
Incumbent firms are challenged today due to
digitalization [1-4]. For example, the traditional
camera industry was seriously challenged when
digital imaging disrupted established business models
and organizing [5, 6] and it has been recognized that
social structures, such as processes and skills, needs
an update in order to cope with the increase of
software in cars [7]. Not coping with the social
structures connected to technology advancement has
proven potentially disastrous [6]. However, it has
also been highlighted how digital innovation together
with institutional entrepreneurship has proven
successful in incumbent firms [8].
In the last couple of years, much research has
focused on digital innovation exploring the
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underlying mechanisms, inbuilt practices associated
with digital innovation and challenges and
possibilities connected to it [9-11]. In this paper we
continue on this path and explore digital product
innovation networks [12] within a firm. More so, we
use the classification of digital product innovation
networks as sensitizing concepts [13] in order to
understand what happens in organizations when
digitalized solutions are developed and introduced
into an incumbent firm fitted for product
manufacturing. We have studied an automotive
manufacturer, AutoInc, with a particular focus on
their development work enabling Over-The-Air
(OTA) software updates. In order to understand the
prerequisites for the organization to undertake the
OTA service and do digital innovation, we used the
mirroring hypotheses [14] as a foundation for our
analysis as the mirroring concept is reliably
applicable to automotive organizational settings.
Mirroring hypothesis stems from modularity,
product innovation and manufacturing, arguing that
an organization should mirror the product it produces
in order to be successful [15, 16]. AutoInc, as many
incumbent product developing firms, was organized
according to its physical components, such as a
division dedicated to powertrain (engine) and one to
chassis (the internal physical frame). However, with
digitalization and digital innovation, such mirroring
needs to be rethought and adjusted [9].
With this as a background, we asked ourselves:
How does digital innovation influence mirroring in
incumbent firms? And more so, how can we
understand the effects of different digital product
innovation networks within the same organization?
With empirical data collected during a period of
three years at AutoInc, we show how different digital
product innovation networks exists within the same
firm and what effects that have. Overall, this study
generates the following insights:
 Anarchic actions, in the federative innovation
network
can
cause
disturbance
and
responsibility confusion.
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Anarchy can be interpreted differently (as
cooperative or non-cooperative) and be
manifested in at least two different ways; i)
directly by dictating business-goals and ii)
indirectly by dictating what fundamental
technological capabilities would be developed
and thereby the possible solutions that in turn
limit or dictates possible business.
 Practical applicability of the mirroring
hypothesis can assist in overcoming
digitalization dynamics.
The paper proceeds as follows; we begin by
reviewing the mirroring hypothesis [14, 17] as we
can see strong support for mirroring at AutoInc. This
is followed by an overview of the digital innovation
literature. In the digital innovation literature we hone
in on digital product innovation networks, which we
use as sensitizing concepts [13] in order to
understand what was going on at AutoInc. We further
direct our attention to anarchism [18, 35] and shortly
give an overview of the concept. We then describe
the method used when collecting and analyzing the
empirical data, followed by presenting the empirical
case and insights. We end the paper with a discussion
of our insights and finalize the paper with our
conclusions.

2. The mirroring hypothesis
The mirroring hypothesis literature is based on
modularity and asserts that organizational structures
corresponds to the technical architecture the
organization attempts to develop. The mirroring is
described as linkages between the design and tasks
required in order to realize the design [14, 17]. Other
research call this socio-technical congruence [19],
fundamental isomorphism [16], or plainly morphisms
[1].
Research has shown that mirroring is highly
valuable when understanding why organizations are
structured the way they are dependent on what they
are developing and producing. It has also been
highlighted that the mirroring hypothesis does not
apply well to open collaborative projects, most of
which focused on software development [17].
However, researchers have used the theory as a way
to understand what happens to organizations when
digitalization dynamics trigger changes, for example
when new digital tools are taken into use or new
software based processes are required [1, 20].
Hylving [1] extends the concept of mirroring, or
morphisms, to include second order morphisms. The
second order morphisms recognize how other
structures indirectly are connected to the artifact

being developed. For example, developing user
experience (UX) possibilities, instead of only a
physical product, require new business models.
However, when developing the UX solution it is
easily done to only focus on the UX solution itself,
and forget about what supporting structures are
needed in order to utilize the UX solution [1]. In
other words, it describes how everything is
interconnected to each other in one or the other way.
In this paper we use mirroring hypothesis as a
starting point since the empirical setting is a product
manufacturing
firm
with
well-established
organizational structures based on the physical
architecture of the product they produce; the vehicle.

3. Digital innovation and digital product
innovation networks
Digital innovation can be defined as the carrying
out of new combinations of digital and physical
components to produce novel products [9]. Digital
artifacts are produced by ever-changing combinations
of patterns of technologies, routines and cognition
[21]. This offers new ways of interacting with,
thinking about, relating to and working with the
developed artifacts [22]. As many different industries
are going thru digital transformations endeavoring
digital innovation, new logics emerge [2]. For
example, the automotive industry traditionally
considered as a manufacturing industry producing
vehicles, now is categorized as a platform industry
[8, 23, 24] where a federative way of working is
implemented around the platform as the central
module in the highly modularized product
architecture. Naturally, this involves the network of
actors responsible for those modules.
Based on the idea of a network of heterogeneous
actors [25, 26], digital product innovation networks is
defined as groups of more or less heterogeneous
actors and their tools. These groups are included in
complex socio-technical networks that embody
different forms of knowledge [12]. Digital product
innovation is thereby a distributed phenomenon
characterized by network effects, messiness,
ambiguity, and combinability [21].
There are four different digital product innovation
networks, namely; Project, Clan, Federated and
Anarchic [12]. The Project innovation network
consists of a rather homogenous group of people
where control and coordination is centralized. The
Clan also consists of homogenous people but the
coordination and control is distributed. The Clan is
usually driven by a common interest and relatively
well-defined set of tools that are readily identified
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and mobilized for effective cognitive and social
translations [12]. Example of a clan network are the
open–source communities [27, 28] where the actors
act according to their common goal, but with very
limited, or no, centralized control and coordination.
The federated innovation network has centralized
controlled but uses knowledge from a diverse set of
resources. In large manufacturing organizations, such
as automotive OEMs, federated innovation networks
can be considered norm as knowledge, expertise and
skills are distributed although the control and
coordination of these resources are centralized [8].
The Digital Innovation definition of anarchic
action is based on the dimension of control of the
process, structure and outcomes, which is distributed
(and not centrally governed) [12]. This definition also
includes knowledge resources being distributed and
not being known a priori, as exemplified in [36].
According to the Meriam-Webster Dictionary [35],
anarchism in general is defined as absence or denial
of any authority or established order. Others have
described the ultimate goal of anarchism as being to
create a free society which allows all human beings
to realize their full potential [18] and to deny
authority [29]. The general definition of anarchism is
thereby relative to a presumed governance of some
form while digital innovation essentially defines it as
any action that is self-motivated, albeit still
cooperative. Anarchic innovation networks are in this
sense dynamic and complex socio-technical systems
consisting of heterogeneous and self-driven actors
operating a diverse set of tools and other resources.
[12]. This diversity of control makes different
innovation trajectories intervene with and influence
each other [8]. Anarchic action is here defined as
action taken by actors in anarchic digital innovation
networks.
Institutional entrepreneurship [30] and anarchic
action [12] are significantly but not entirely
overlapping ways of acting and being. Institutional
entrepreneurship is for instance inherently
endogenous and relative to some form of governance
[30] which anarchic actions need not be as such
restrictions are not present in that definition [12]. On
the other hand, anarchic actions stipulate distributed
knowledge resources [12] whereas the definition of
institutional entrepreneurship does not specify such a
restriction [30]. Institutional entrepreneurs are
organized actors who envision new institutions as a
means of advancing interests they value highly yet
that are suppressed by extant logics [30]. Institutional
entrepreneurs, thus, clearly fulfill the basic
requirements to be considered anarchic as defined by
[12]. However, Institutional entrepreneur’s actions
are on top of this also aware, and calculative from a

positive sense (i.e. cooperative and constructive)
[30]. They are often less connected to organizational
norms and have a weaker connection to established
processes and also that they are often disadvantaged
by prevailing arrangements and stand to benefit from
change [31]. This presumption of drivers behind the
action does not exist in the definition of anarchic
action. This however raises the question what is
meant by negative, destructive contribution or
passiveness and what anarchic label such action then
should have and also who should make the
determination of what is positive or negative.

Figure 1: Institutional entrepreneurship vs.
Anarchic action
Consequently, there is a void in the more detailed
definition of institutional entrepreneurship and less so
in the less restricted (and less colorful) definition of
action in anarchic digital innovation networks [12].

4. Method
The
following
section
describes
the
methodological approach on this qualitative paper.

4.1

Data Collection

Along the development cycle of the OTA
software service, the main author participated in the
development and observed the progress. This allowed
him to take part of all business-, requirements- and
project meetings along with having access to
documentation connected to the project. The
participation of the first author started with the
industrialization of the function in year 2012 and
ended with the quality audit of the project in year
2015. Data were collected under a non-disclosure
agreement and include several hundred documents.
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For this paper, we focused on project-,
governance- and requirements-documents in the form
of emails, minutes-of-meetings, generated office
documents, diary notations, plans, and presentations.
Data was also collected in interviews that were partly
transcribed and anonymized before being brought
into the data analysis.

4.2

Data analysis

The analysis of the case study- and project writeups [32] were run through key participants in order
ensure its correctness. Analysis was carried out
jointly in the research team to achieve
complementary insights and enhanced confidence in
the findings [33]. The write-ups as well as interview
transcripts were the continuous basis of a thematic
and inductive analysis [37, 13] that focused on
identifying inconsistencies in the three aspects of
Organization/Process, Project and Functionality. The
focus was to detect ‘problems’ which were then
elaborated and categorized and screened through
discussions regarding distinctiveness, involved kinds
of structures (‘is it a lack in social-to-technical
mirroring, in social-to-social or something else?’) and
also regarding usability in research documentation
and presentations.

5. Empirical Findings
5.1

within R&D designing wheels (rims) and a team in
purchasing procuring wheels for Manufacturing who
have had a team responsible for preparing wheels for
manufacturing and a station in the production line
where wheels were added to the vehicles being
manufactured.

AutoInc before and during the project

Ever since the start of the European vehicle
manufacturer AutoInc, the company has been
organized around the physical architecture of the
vehicle and its traditional lifecycle; design,
production, sales, and maintenance. Overall, the
company has had a Product Planning (PP) department
ordering vehicles and other products, an R&D
department
designing
the
vehicles,
and
Manufacturing (M/F) responsible for turning those
designs into real vehicles. Manufactured vehicles
have then been made available for sales by the
Marketing and Sales (MS) organization and then the
After Sales (AS) organization has provided Dealers
& Workshops with the tools and parts to service the
vehicles on behalf of the vehicle owners. Finally, an
IT department providing all of the company with
computers to automate the work as well as a
Financial (FI) department assuring the money needed
to sustain all these activities.
In particular R&D, Purchasing and Manufacturing
have internally been organized around the structure
of the vehicle. For instance, there has been a group

Figure 2: AutoInc Organization
Over the decades of vehicle evolution, as vehicles
begun having electrical system, there has likewise
been departments throughout the company managing
what started out as simple lights and horn to today’s
advanced IT networks on wheels. A car from AutoInc
include more than 100 small computers (for the
vehicle alone) called ECUs – Electrical Control
Units. Each ECU has their own set of software’s
programmed into them to do their respective parts of
the necessary functionalities, for example controlling
breaks or handling all that is visible in the main
infotainment display. The organization of the
electrical department in R&D has evolved with this
evolution in the structure of electrical systems or
functionalities, including software development
teams for areas such as energy management,
infotainment and safety. Consequently, a significant
flow of software maintenance updates and patches
(software parts) have also been created, tested,
approved and provided to the vehicle workshops for
installation as part of the traditional vehicle service
appointments. All in very much the same way as
hardware parts.

5.2

Digitalization transformations at
AutoInc

In 2012, inspired by the smartphone mobile
industry and another OEM, AutoInc embarked on an
infotainment platform project. The infotainment
system was going to be based on apps such as Spotify
and ParkingFinder working on top of an ordinary
operating system instead of having all functionality
written into one big software embedded in a physical
component. This would allow fast changes and
innovation to customer-centric functionalities while
still also having a more stable basic set of car-centric
functionalities. It would also reduce cost since the
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operating system would be something like Linux or
Windows instead of some proprietary and very
special software foundation.
In this way, the
infotainment system could be relatively long-lived,
compared to the old concept of a vehicle’s life cycle
of 5-7 years where software and functionalities were
intertwined with hardware and more difficult to
evolve after manufacturing.
And so it was decided that a ‘remote software
update’ function, eventually named ‘Over The Air’
(OTA) software update, was to be created. An R&D
manager expressed it like this:
“We need to have [vehicle] systems that are up
to date. There is a cost in not doing this, but we
cannot calculate all the option values. We can’t
calculate ROI by using OTA during the first 5 years
but hereafter it will have a business opportunity. We
know however that we can’t wait. In such case we
will lose sales and get lower customer satisfaction. In
the end this is the right thing to do for AutoInc.”
The order from the PP organization was to allow
the customer in the vehicle to use a set of preloaded
and continuously updated apps, and also to update
any of the basic system software of all of the ECUs.
The order prioritized the handful of ECU’s that were
going to be involved in Internet connection
capabilities and thereby suffer risk of hacking. This
first order for OTA function therefore also included
possibilities to update Bluetooth security, WiFi
security, and Infotainment graphics.
To match the new situation, the electrical
department within R&D organized an Infotainment
Platform group responsible for vehicle Applications
Programming Interfaces (APIs). The API’s would
allow user applications like Spotify and Android
Auto to access less risky vehicle functionalities and
data like fan speed settings, temperature level, speed
information, fuel level and more. A group called
Connectivity was also established. They were
responsible for the realization of all Internet
connection related solutions (such as Bluetooth, WiFi, Mobile tethering, 3G/4G).
R&D also initiated an Advanced Engineering predevelopment project, an ‘AE’, with the intent to
deliver technical concepts for the OTA function, for
example software packaging formats, download- and
installation mechanisms and security solutions. The
time plan was to be part of the new vehicle to be
launched in 2015. The AE-project considered OTA
as “just another channel” - a wireless version of the
cord-based software download system that was used
to service the software of the vehicles in vehicle
workshops. But instead of this hardwired cord, the
OTA technology would use mobile communication
technology (3G/4G) and a cloud platform to transfer

the software to the vehicle, and a system in the
vehicle would do the software updates of all the
ECU’s in the vehicle.
In Q3 2012, a Function Owner (FO) was added to
the OTA project. The responsibility of the FO was to
design the function and in this also translate businessrequirements on the OTA function into function
requirements, specifying what and how the OTA
function should work on a solution-independent
level.

Figure 3: Requirements Organization
For instance, a business requirement like “The
function must be robust” could be translated into
functional requirements like:
a) “The data and information sent and received by
the function must be handled by robust
protocols so that no data is lost due to more or
less sporadic Internet connection between the
vehicle and AutoInc”,
and performance requirements such as:
b) “The function must take less than 5 seconds in
continuing operations after downtime or loss of
connectivity”.
All such functional and performance requirements
were documented in the FDR (Function Description
and Requirements) document. The leader of the AE
project was subsequently appointed as the Function
Realization Responsible (FRR) with the task to
design a solution and in this translate the FDR
specification into a Function Realization specification
(FR) and drive creation of a solution that would fit
that FR. For instance, the requirement a) presented
above was translated into solution requirements such
as “There must be a cached communication between
vehicles and servers of the following format …” or
“All communication must contain error-detection and
-correction data of this kind …”.
At this time, the AE-project had already
developed the solution concept and the FR was
mostly already expressing requirements to suppliers
and also to adjacent technological areas in the car in
line with that pre-developed concept. Consequently, a
substantial discrepancy was eventually identified
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between the function specification (FDR) and the
Function realization specification (FR).
The initial dialogs between FO and different
business stakeholders, such as MS and AS, also
revealed the absence of business requirements on the
function (what kind of customers will use this
function and how - what do they want?) and overall
business model (how do we produce and sell this?) as
well as use-cases (how should the function be used?).
Essentially, it became apparent that the role of
Business Stakeholder or business owner never had
been formally defined at AutoInc since the business
had always been about selling vehicles and
accessories, not services or software.
It also became clear that the organization did not
have the processes or people to enter into continuous
dialog with actual customers and from this express
formal business plans and requirements. Instead,
customer input was mostly gained through 3rd party
market reports and occasional interview studies. In
addition, it became clear that engineers and project
managers had compensated the lack of business
owners and their input requirements and calculations
by creating rudimentary business-cases themselves to
motivate or eject deliverables to/from the projects. In
addition, the business focus of the engineers was on
vehicle cost. Lifecycle aspects of the deliverables as
well as profit or even revenue, was limited.
In Q1 2013, R&D surprised the company when
one of its officials stated: “We will be allowing the
customer to add apps individually per vehicle”. This
new direction was contrary to the already decided
path by PP and the FO together that the OTA
function would just update a standard set of preinstalled systems software, apps and other features
per market. With this additional capability (customer
being able to individually add functionality per
vehicle), the complexity of the function increased and
new significant risks were added to the project. For
example, risks associated with having on-demand
variety in apps, risk of slow/faulty or absent
downloads. Additional risks related to handling of
content per vehicle, keeping track of actual individual
status of software in the vehicles, timing- and errorsensitivity aspects as well as a higher demand on
customer interaction. This more difficult goal also
drove new requirements on testing, training,
documentation and marketing.
Finally, the new direction turned the function into
a highly customer-centric function as compared to
car-centric functionality. This meant that the
organization to produce more customer-centric
functionalities such as ‘Restplaces’ or ‘StoryTel’,
was going to need to grow and become more

productive and effective, extrovert and agile than
before the scope change.
R&D needed the function to work as a means to
alleviate pressure on the product development
process (software quality instead could be
complemented during shipment of car to dealers).
The function also enabled R&D to regularly patch
internet related security software to latest possible
status. Finally, it also meant a possibility to regularly
offer new apps in the infotainment system between
new and old vehicle programs. To assure these
benefits, R&D claimed the role of business-owners
and thereby the entitlement to add to, or change, the
scope of the original order. Although the new
demands articulated by R&D added cost, complexity
and risk the whole vehicle project, the strong
legitimacy of R&D within AutoInc, gave them the
power to dictate what would be delivered or not.
In Q2 2013, a Project Manager (PM) for the OTA
project as sub-project to the total vehicle project, was
appointed at the AS organization. The PM started
weekly cross-organizational meetings where all
technical coordination was brought up. All technical
leaders related to the in-vehicle solution as well as
outside of vehicle (‘off-board’), were invited. The
weekly meetings focused on different technological
components of the OTA solution, and actions
required to manage overall risks of not delivering the
OTA function with right quality in time.

Figure 4: Governance Organization
On an overall OTA project governance level, a
weekly governing Technical Management Meeting
was launched, involving senior line managers from
R&D. This way of organizing sub-project was
standard operations in vehicle development projects.
Through technical management meetings like the one
for OTA, AS, IT and MS together with R&D jointly
handled overall governing decisions regarding
resources and priorities of all major separate projects.
At this time the FRR informed the project that
R&D would focus on ‘the OTA channel’ because this
was the vehicle-centric part of the solution. This
basically meant that the technical solution needed for
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the OTA function in the vehicle was essentially the
only priority for R&D. This was in line with the
prevailing Automotive development view and
business model focusing on car and technology. As
an incumbent traditional vehicle development
organization, R&D would not take responsibility for
technical requirements or development outside the
vehicle that was not directly and technically linked to
the vehicle (such as supporting IT, sales support,
workshop support), nor for operations development
(adding staff, creating or changing processes),
content
handling
(overall
managing
what
functionalities were built into what software) nor for
serviceability (assuring solutions for the vehicle
workshops to be able to service the vehicle). The
governing Technical Management Meeting accepted
this.
In Q1 2014, R&D communicated that due to
technical limitations, the current software (that was
traditionally developed to be installed in the vehicle
in the factory and to update and maintain the vehicles
at workshops), was not automatically going to be
possible to install via the OTA function. Any
software intended for deployment to vehicles via the
OTA function had to be specifically tailored and
packaged. If any part of the OTA-package included a
software that the specific part of the vehicle did not
support being installed via OTA, then none of the
software in that package would become installed.
Since there were only a few parts of the vehicles that
were going to be able to support OTA software
installation, this restriction considerably limited the
potential use of the function. Especially since
software packages would almost always contain
multiple software parts. Neither the Technical
Management Meeting nor the vehicle project
addressed this issue. Consequently, the project
organization
was
never
complemented
to
accommodate for the need of generating a new or
improved software packaging organization.
In Q2 2014, the persons acting FO and PM were
additionally tasked with assuring that the OTA
function could be supported worldwide at dealers, in
workshops and in call-centers. This included building
necessary IT-system for the workshop technicians to
use when looking into the potential errors reported by
the customers and workshops. The new more
customer-oriented focus dictated by R&D here
presented new challenges to AS on top of the
traditional one;
a) Support and fault-tracing of a customer-centric
function rather than a traditional vehicle-centric
function.
b) Support and fault-trace any problems with the
explicit content offers that was now going to be

individually selectable by end customers and
per vehicle.
c) Support a distributed function that was not only
implemented in the car but involved the
AutoInc Cloud and other systems.
While these consequential challenges were
understood by some of the project members, the
Technical Management Meeting did not formally
include them into the OTA project scope. Nor did the
AS organization traditionally have the formal task to
define or deploy any separate project for such
customer-oriented deliverables. AS traditional task
had always been to develop workshop support
capability for vehicle-centric functions only. With
limited resources, AS never created the capability
necessary for customer support and due to lack of
resources, the capability for workshop support was
also severely limited, even by traditional measures.
In Q3 2015 a quality audit following the official
end of the project recognized, elicited and
documented 55 problems from the OTA project. This
included 42 issues pertaining to governance and
project management, 9 pertaining to development
process and actual realization of the function and 2
issues related to organization and processes. Overall,
the audit summarized that the limited managerial as
well as technical and social understanding of the
sociotechnical structure and complexity of the
deliverable, was a factor severely impeding
development as well as governance of the
development. The report stated that “Responsibility
for development of connected functions is
partial/unclear”. Out of these 55 problems, four (4)
represented formal quality system deviations, which
were processed by AutoInc managerial teams on
behalf of the corporate quality organization.

6. Discussion
Reviewed literature, for instance [1, 14, 15, 16,
17, 19] all testify to mirroring being more or less
pronounced and relevant in development. In our
empirics and theoretical study, we have used the term
Mismatch to indicate a lack or absence of mirroring
and from our empirics, we have excavated 3
exemplifying mismatches.
The first excavated mismatch exemplify how
Advanced Engineering can limit delivery of
functionality. We saw in the case how the money for
the OTA function was already consumed by R&D
advanced engineering. As a result, when the
specification for the OTA function was delivered,
there was no money nor any time to develop a fitting
technology concept. The consequential problem of
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discrepancy between function requirements and this
solution concept was solved by truncating the
specification to match the pre-developed technology.
This essentially limited the possibilities to deliver the
OTA solution and required that business accepted
delaying the development of the missing
functionalities. We find no distinct account for this
kind of tech-to-tech mismatches or conflict in the
reviewed literature [14, 17].
The second excavated mismatch concerned a
dissonance between R&D and the product planning
(PP) regarding the scope of the deliverable as
required by business, where R&D declared that they
would extend the solution to include user’s ability to
add and delete apps in the vehicles. In other words, a
change in technological scope or structure posing
mismatch with mainly organizational structures.
Interestingly, R&D diversion from the original
business order in technical solution design decisions,
was common due to R&D leading projects that
ultimately had to deliver. With limited resources and
a set deadline, quality or size of deliverables basically
remained the only variable. Thus, project downscoping and technical compromises are commonplace
in the everyday R&D activity. Open controversy
between what in federative sense is the ordering unit
(PP) versus delivering unit (R&D), was on the other
hand rare.
Both this second excavated mismatch and the first
were due to anarchic actions as R&D in both cases
acted on its own accord as a separate party outside of
the federative norm. In the second example, R&D not
only claimed their traditional jurisdiction over
technology solutions but also a partially overriding
role on the business ordering level. The motivation
was their own need of the service and also being the
organization that initiated the idea. R&D decisions
need not necessarily bring additional mirroring needs.
However,
this
second
decision
redirected
development towards additional operational changes.
Regardless of an initiating action being anarchic
or not, direct and heterogenic mismatches like the
second excavated mismatch, are relatively common
in the field of digital innovation within Automotive
since the organizational structures are very much
aligned with vehicle lifecycle and technology
hierarchies and thus in general very poorly resembles
the structure of distributed and more horizontally
integrated digital services. Such mismatches pose
question-marks to the company and projects on who
(what organization) should be responsible for some,
often entirely new kind of deliverable.
Finally, in the third excavated mismatch no one
was assigned from R&D to be in charge of assuring
the process and organization for specifically creating,

packaging, testing and release of software that was to
be offered and deployed using OTA. R&D task in the
project was to design and deliver the technical OTA
solution, not assure there was working content
available to use it. The mismatch or lack of mirroring
existed regardless of anarchic actions between an
organizational need and the already existing R&D
organization tasked with producing and testing all
software with the traditional aim of deploying it in
factory and in vehicle maintenance only. Since the
project never altered its structure to also design
necessary organization to produce specific OTA
software, ultimately a technical solution was
developed but not the organization necessary to use
it.
Looking closer to the defining literature [1, 14,
15, 16, 17, 19], we find that neither organization-toorganization nor technology-to-technology mirroring
are specifically documented as part of the definition
of mirroring. Nor is the relation between cause and
effect such as change in technology scope driving a
need of other changes or adaptions. This makes it
difficult to discuss in terms of what kind of change in
one structure would be needed specifically due to a
change in another. The theorem and adjacent
definitions just define the possible existence of
relations between social and technical structures in a
timeless manner. Neither does the definitions
distinguish between different kinds of technical
structures like Communication, HMI (Human
Machine Interaction) or Powertrain and how such
structures may affect one another. Furthermore, the
second order mismatches or propagated lacks of
mirroring where one creates another which in turn
drives a third (and so on) as defined by [1] as an
extension to mirroring, is left without consideration
in most other documents.
This study has highlighted the possible existence
of mismatches between structures of the same kinds,
both social and technical in Automotive digital
innovation. The difference in technological structure
drove a lack or mirroring in both technology-related
organizational structure (more agile and capable
software production and customer support) as well as
in business organization structures (need to handle
software and related information more explicitly as
offers portfolio to customers). Likewise, there was a
need for difference in company organizational
structure that was not mirrored by project
organizational structure and thus the company
structure was never adjusted. These empirics indicate
that the concept of mirroring might be possible to
extend further. Finally, the examples of mismatches
documented in this article were a few selected from a
larger set which required no deeper analysis or
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elicitation to be found. This indicates that there likely
are more to be found in this case and possibly in
many other practical industrial case.
This study thus indicatively confirms the
existence of mirroring and inherent anarchic
tendencies within the same otherwise federative
Automotive innovation network. The anarchic
tendencies exemplified, also provide indicative
verification of the predicted “southeastward”
movement in the content and scope of product
innovation. As also stated by [12], their outlined
categories can therefore not be discrete. If, however
they are considered additive and scalable properties
on a continuum, such a revised theory can better
account for the empirics of this study as well as for
nuances already found in the nature of (Automotive)
digital innovation networks.
Having continuously scaled additive properties
however raises the question on how to do a more
fine-grained evaluation of innovation network
properties. Consequently, scholars aiming to assist in
this regard are urged to further explore nuances in the
definitions of the grading and definitions of the
existing two properties of the product digital network
[12] as well as consider if there are additional
significant effects deserving to be established as
properties.
The
concept
of
institutional
entrepreneurship [31, 34] offers some possible
candidate antecedents to explore further as properties
of digital innovation networks. Further dive into
these antecedents, into the difference between the
concepts and perhaps a suitable basic ontology would
be great strides towards a further improved digital
innovation networks properties- or classification
scheme/continuum.

7. Conclusion and contribution
We can draw several conclusions from this paper.
First, this paper show that the concept of mirroring is
indicatively applicable in manufacturing contexts as
well as software development. Secondly, upon
entering the world of digital innovation,
organizations can suffer from indirect and direct
mismatches. That is, we have illustrated how
technology does not mirror with technology,
organization does not mirror technology, and
organization does not mirror organization. Third,
anarchic action can exist in federated innovation
networks. Consequently, the networks described by
Lyytinen et al (2015) are only a foundation for
discussion and nothing that can be used to categorize
groups/networks of people in a definite way. Thus, it
is possible to look at properties of innovation

networks and consider the different dimensions as
continuum instead of four different categories.
Finally, the concept of institutional entrepreneurship
may offer candidate antecedents to explore further as
properties of anarchic action in digital innovation
networks.
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